Blog Archives - NBA Focus

My top 30

6/26/2012

I have already stated what I would probably do if I had a high pick in this lottery: trade down. While I fully expect other players from the 2012 draft besides Anthony Davis to become All-Stars, it is too hard to figure out who those will be. So I would probably rather have a couple picks near the middle of the first round, instead of just one single high pick.

I do not get to spend personal time with these players, and have no access to medical information regarding them, so on both those counts I have to go by what is just generally known. In this board the only player that has been docked because of injury risks is Jared Sullinger, who I originally had in the top 5. Here's my top 30:

1. Anthony Davis
2. Bradley Beal
3. Dion Waiters
4. Andre Drummond
5. Michael Kidd-Gilchrist
6. John Henson
7. Tony Wroten
8. Quincy Miller
9. Damian Lillard
10. Jared Sullinger
11. Terrence Jones
12. Jae Crowder
13. Will Barton
14. Draymond Green
15. Thomas Robinson
16. Tyler Zeller
17. Moe Harkless
18. Marquis Teague
19. Jeremy Lamb
20. Royce White
21. Harrison Barnes
22. Andrew Nicholson
23. Evan Fournier
24. Terrence Ross
25. Kendall Marshall
26. Perry Jones
27. Meyers Leonard
28. Marcus Denmon
29. Austin Rivers
30. Miles Plumlee

Normal bad wizardry

6/24/2012

I wanted to at least mention last week's Hornets-Wizards trade, because it epitomizes how badly Washington has handled its roster for years. Finally in the position to get Rashard Lewis' huge contract (which originally had been Gilbert Arenas' huge contract) fully off their books after 2012-13, Ernie Grunfeld and gang instead decided to add over $20 million onto their '13-14 payroll by trading for two completely replaceable players.

The Wizards simply could have been on the hook for Lewis' $14 million (guaranteed) salary this upcoming year. They could have bought him out and gone on focusing on the draft. Instead Washington decided to make this trade and pay Emeka Okafor and Trevor Ariza $43 million over the next two seasons. Folks, that's bad business.

Okafor and Ariza are probably okay to have on your team - if their combined salaries don't exceed $10 million annually.  Otherwise they are just vastly overpaid. There is a reason Washington has sucked for years, and it's mainly because they always overpay players who are not that good. Grunfeld is truly a horrendous decision-maker in that regard. He always overvalues veterans. It's somewhat amazing he still has a job.

For New Orleans the trade is a nice way to clear salary, and a no-brainer.  As a bonus they also get a second round pick - which they could potentially  use on an intriguing prospect like Jae Crowder or Marcus Denmon.  But the main praise for this trade comes from their laudable feat of being able to get rid of two highly overpaid players with only relatively minor collateral damage. $14 million down the hole is a hell of a lot better than $43 million. Unfortunately, I have the feeling that the Hornets will now proceed to overpay Eric Gordon...

Quick Finals reflections

6/23/2012

Well, that was rather anti-climatic. After a highly anticipated lead up, the Finals seemed to come to an abrupt end. The Miami Heat are champions. I will probably write more about the Heat and the Thunder later this summer, but I want to mention the main thing that struck me in this Finals: it was a hell of a lot closer than the 4-1 series margin would indicate.

Honestly, from an objective standpoint, I have a hard time saying that the Heat were any better than the Thunder this year. Just like I have a hard time saying the Thunder were any better than the Spurs. The truth is all three of those teams were very good, and at the end of the day it just so happened that the tables tilted in Miami's favor.

This is to take nothing away from Miami - they played their best basketball this season when it mattered most. They fully deserve to be 2012 champs. But it is worth mentioning the relative parity of the top three teams in 2011-12, because I can already sense the revisionist history being written - something along the lines of "The LeBron James Redemption Song," and that Miami was destined to win the title this year. They weren't. Let's not be fooled.

Two incidents in these Finals stood out in making this series potentially shorter than it should have been. The first is the much discussed third quarter benching of Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook in Game 3. Scott Brooks chose a bad time to sit his best two players, and the momentum swing with both of them on the bench may have cost OKC that game.

A more egregious shift in the series occurred in Game 4. And unfortunately it involved the officiating. I am not someone who constantly knocks the officials, but they did a lousy job in Game 4, and it swung the game and series right into Miami's hands. I'm surprised analysts were not more critical of the refs immediately following that game.

When a star plays as well as Westbrook did in Game 4, and his team loses, something is usually up. Either Westbrook's teammates didn't play well, or they got hurt by the officials. In Game 4, the latter was the case. Watching that game you cannot tell me Westbrook only deserved to go to the line three times. And you cannot tell me OKC as a whole deserved to shoot only 16 free throws when they were that aggressive offensively. After LeBron hit that all ready famous three pointer to put Miami up 97-94, Durant came down for a mid-range pullup and was stripped by Dwyane Wade. There is a chance it was a clean steal, but judging by Durant's immediate reaction of violently screaming at the officials I doubt it. That play typified the entire night.

I'm not being biased here - OKC got poor treatment by the officials in Game 4, and it obviously changed the complexion of the series. You can talk about the Thunder being young, but they played well in every game but the finale. They probably deserved in the very least a longer series than what they got. However, when all is said and done, Miami stayed composed and came up bigger when it counted. That is what people will talk about, and that is why they are the champs.

All the freshman in this draft are making it confusing

6/21/2012

There are potentially nine freshman that will be taken in the first round of this year's draft. Freshman are notoriously hard to get a bead on - one year of college is simply not enough time to get an accurate picture of what a player can potentially become. If this draft seems particularly dicey, a big reason why are these nine freshman. It's hard to know what to make of them.

There is a chance that the best three or four players in this draft are freshman, but there is also a possibility that all nine of them will disappoint us. So it goes. Many of these kids are in the first year living away from home. They have to adjust to the social landscape of college, along with the realization that they are no longer vastly superior to the players they are competing against. There is so much going on that the actual baskeball aspect can sometimes be secondary for these guys - and that is pretty understandable.

Therefore from a business standpoint you can see why it makes much more sense for the NBA to require two years of college before players can enter the draft, for the simple reason that it is easier to have a fuller sense of a player after watching him for two seasons as opposed to one. And with all that said, I'm very high on this freshman class. I have a feeling that quite a few of them are going to be excellent pros.

Here's a breakdown of the nine, listed in my order of preference.  Honestly, once you get past Davis there is not that huge of a difference in how I feel about almost all the others. There is a lot of intrigue and risk surrounding all of them...

Anthony Davis - Not much to say here that has not been already said. He looks like a future hall of famer, and is the unanimous first pick. Here was the rare freshman with virtually no difficulties transitioning from high school to college.

Bradley Beal - Beal seemed to get more comfortable as the year went on, and looks to me like a future all-star. His freshman numbers were good, but not great. Also he is a little on the short side. I think he will be in the very least a solid pro, but you never know. A risky pick at #2 or #3.

Andre Drummond -  Nobody in this draft is simutaneously as fascinating and frightening as Drummond. His upside is tremendous. This makes him probably the most controversial pick in the lottery. Statistically Drummond was just adequate, but I wonder if we are being too negative judging him by his numbers. He is very young, not even 19 until August. We should not necessarily expect all freshman big men to be dominant, and Drummond's physical traits are incredible. Would I take him #2? No. But would I strongly consider him with the fourth or fifth pick? Absolutely. Especially in a draft as dubious as this is up top.

Michael Kidd-Gilchrist - Kidd-Gilchrist was another freshman who had little difficulty adjusting to the college game. Unlike Davis, his talent does not necessarily translate to dominance on the next level. Statistically he does not look like a surefire top prospect, and watching him I never got the sense that he would have the skills necessary to make an All-Star game.  That said, he seems like the safest freshman pick besides Davis, and should be a fine pro.

Tony Wroten - Wroten has flashed a variety of skills - a scorer's mentality, superior athleticism, and great size - that make his freshman inefficiency less worrisome. He might drop out of the first round, potentially making him one of the steals of the draft.

Quincy Miller - Miller scored high in Hollinger's rating system, and he was still recovering from an ACL injury last year. He seems like a prospect with considerable potential.

Moe Harkless - Harkless showed up at Saint John's and was good right away, always a good sign. The advanced stats don't shine too brightly on Harkless, but his athleticism and youth implies a pretty decent prospect in my eyes.

Marquis Teague - Teague was somewhat underlooked playing alongside his more touted Kentucky teammates, but he flashes many of the skills that have made his brother Jeff a starting point guard in the NBA. He could be a relative steal later in round one.

Austin Rivers - Like Teague, Rivers has familial pedigree working in his favor. A fine college player, many of us are concerned that his skillset will not translate well playing against bigger and more physical guards. However, Rivers will be given plenty of opportunities to succeed - being young and intriguing affords you that luxury.

Late first round and second round "sleepers"

6/16/2012

First of all, these guys are not sleepers. The "advanced" statistical community is well aware of all the players I am about to mention. I take no credit for discovering any of these guys. But I will take credit for understanding their potential values better than most NBA executives.

Especially in a draft that seems dubious up top, multiple later picks are the way to go. Cleveland (picks #24, #33, #34) for instance could probably draft all three of these guys I am about to talk about. If even one of the three turns out to be very good they would consider it a successful draft. That's the beauty of late picks - you only have to be right some of the time to make the whole thing worthwhile.

My process for evaluating players in the draft, and specifically with underrated players, is to look at the stats first. People like Ed Weiland, the Wages of Wins guys, and John Hollinger have all proven that statistical evaluation is extremely suitable for analyzing college prospects. I value this kind of input the most.

I also consider the eye test. Obviously it helps if a player looks good, and has a pro-style type of athleticism. Sometimes a player has only decent stats but looks amazing - I put considerable stock in that. But if a player looks good and has bad stats I will be leery of him.

Finally I think it is important to value the opinions of pundits on the ground, guys who speak to lots of pro scouts and see players work out firsthand, like Jonathan Givony and Chad Ford. Their opinions, which are usually similar to most NBA scouts, can be very valuable.

The point is you can't be too strict in how you analyze college players. There is a hell of a lot of uncertainty involved. To be a slave to stats when it comes to the draft is stupid. But to not deeply look at the numbers is even more foolish. If a little more merit was put on statistics it would make most teams draft better. This is why Weiland is probably the best at what he does - he comprehensively looks at the numbers and still understands they can hardly tell everything about a player.

But enough about this. Let's get on to three players who likely won't get picked until late in the first round or later. I expect all three to be very good professionals, and perhaps stars, if given the opportunity:

Jae Crowder, Marquette
Crowder is a nice example of an excellent prospect hiding in plain sight. He was Big East Player of the Year this past season, but somehow never generated much first round buzz. Most statheads love him. Crowder is one of those guys who does everything well, particularly defensively. The only real knock on him is his height - he's probably no taller than 6'5''. That said, I doubt he will have a hard time guarding forwards in the league. Defensively, Crowder looks to be an exceptional player. I fully expect him to to be able to defend multiple positions. On top of his excellent statistics, Crowder seems to possess the mentality to work hard on improving his game as his career progresses. Apparently in preparation for the next level he is already working on his shooting guard skills. He probably deserves to go in the lottery, and will instead likely drop to the middle of the second round. That makes him a rather obvious steal.

Will Barton, Memphis
Barton is another stathead gem. Memphis was kind of off the national radar this year, and in all likelihood that hurt Barton's draft stock. If he played at UNC or Duke he might be regarded as a lottery pick. He has that kind of talent. He can score, rebound, and pass at an above-average level - a skill set that should translate well to the NBA. If Barton can remain healthy (he's skinny) there is an excellent chance he will play in the league for a long time. Chad Ford the other day called Barton his favorite projected second rounder, and it's pretty easy to see why.

Draymond Green, Michigan State
Green is the kind of player who seems to always be picked later than he should be. An undersized power forward, he is an exceptional passer for his size and a good outside shooter. His numbers across the board are excellent. The concern at the next level is that he will not be able to defend forwards - a concern, like with Crowder, that holds little bearing. A creative player who comes with an excellent college pedigree, I expect Green to be a solid player in the league for the next decade.

The beauty of later picks

6/14/2012

Like I mentioned the other day, somewhere before the end of the first round most teams stop taking the draft seriously. The underlying assumption is that if a player drops past pick number twenty it is unlikely that he will become a good pro. This is counterfactual thinking, as every year there are numerous picks taken later in the draft that turn into valuable players.  Therefore the easiest way to take advantage of the draft is usually to exploit the perception that later picks cannot turn into very good players. The goal in the late first round and the second round should be to identify players that you think will be effective in the NBA and then to draft them.

Late first rounders and second rounders are all very, very cheap assets to have on your roster. You can lock them in contractually for several years for a relative pittance, especially compared to their veteran counterparts. This means you are allowed the luxury of screwing up late picks. Let's say you have three picks in a draft, and all come well after the lottery - you can hit on only one of your three picks and still consider it a successful draft. That's because these later picks are so inexpensive.  Those three drafted players combined will only cost you maybe three million dollars a year - essentially the equivalent of one proven, mediocre veteran. Late picks are so valuable because they are so cheap - and they have the potential to turn into superb players.

It is always smart to have a few of these later picks on your roster. They are too cheap and attractive an asset to not have on a team. But what NBA team really does this? Who cultivates late picks really well? San Antonio?  Houston? Sacramento? Anybody?  No team does it exceptionally. We have to start paying more attention to this "boring" part of the draft, because there is incredible undiscovered value there.

Every draft there are talented players waiting to be picked and thrown into the right situation.  The key is finding those guys and then trying to give them a decent opportunity. Sometimes it's obvious. For instance last year it was shocking Kenny Faried lasted on the board as long as he did. Here was a guy who was truly a superior college rebounder, and led the country in PER and WS/40 his senior year (his junior year he was third and first, respectively.) Apparently that didn't matter to most teams. This season he had one of the highest rookie Player Efficiency Ratings ever. He lasted to pick #22.

It usually is not quite as obvious as in the case of Faried, but every year there are players similar to him. Some late 2012 first round picks and secound rounders will turn out to be very good. In the next post we will go over a few possibilities of who that could be.

Draft selection positions and expectations

6/12/2012

Because it might be worthwhile to clarify, I think I should expound a little bit about how executives should generally approach each section of the draft. I spoke the other day about how if a team has a very high selection they should feel very confident they will be drafting a star - otherwise they are better off trading down, or trading for an established, talented veteran.

Obviously you never want to make a bad selection, but the truth is that it is impossible to avoid making bad picks sometimes. That said, we should hedge our bets as best as we can by using as much statistical information as possible to project a college player's future success. And we should recognize that there is value in every part of the draft. We can get good value at pick #60 - especially if we sign second round picks to long-term, partially guaranteed deals. Obviously second round picks are very safe and inexpensive gambles. Top ten picks are the opposite. So a quick rundown of what a general manager should expect when selecting from certain draft positions...

Picks #1 through #3:

You want to feel extremely confident that any player you select in the top 3 will end up in at least an All-Star game or two. Otherwise that player is a bad pick. Every draft will produce at least a few players that make all-star teams. If you don't strongly think the player you select will be an all-star trade the pick.

Picks #4 through #7:

You want to feel confident you are drafting a potential all-star, and in the very least a player that should have a long, productive NBA career. There is some virtue in risking a pick at this point on a player with a huge upside but serious red flags (like Andre Drummond this year) but in general I suggest staying away from that route. In the top 7 of a draft you can always find yourself a very solid player, and usually an all-star if you are smart and a little lucky.

Picks #8 to #15:

This is often an interesting part of the draft, and maybe one of the better points to risk a pick and swing for the fences by drafting a high risk/high reward prospect. Or it can be just as good to be conservative and draft a player you are pretty certain should be an excellent pro. The end of the lottery always has plenty of value.

Picks #16 to #25:

Traditionally these are the last portion of picks NBA teams are heavily invested in. After around pick #25 we always seem to have most teams stop taking who they draft seriously. Therefore if you have a pick in this part of a draft try to get someone you are pretty sure will be good (i.e. Kenny Faried last year.) If you don't love any player in this part of the draft you are best served to trade down for multiple picks in the next section.

Picks #26 to #40:

A great part of the draft. Most teams lower expectations at this point, while in reality there are potential all-stars and future starters available for cheap. It is great to have multiple picks in this part of the draft. Chances are if you miss with one pick you will at least hit with the other (at least if you are using statistical analysis.) Cleveland this year has picks #24, #33 and #34.

Picks #41 to #60:

A great place to find players who you can sign for cheap and who can (often quickly) become part of your rotation. Sign these players to partially guaranteed long-term deals.

Undrafted free agents:

There is always talent that goes undrafted. Usually undrafted players are given a terrible opportunity to prove themselves in the league. It is wise to give some of these players a decent amount of opportunity to see if they can actually play in the league.

A few words on the conference finals

6/11/2012

Plenty of things have been written about both conference finals, of which I have little to add. What struck me was that many of us had OKC and Miami meeting in the Finals at the beginning of the season, but midway through both the Western and Eastern series most of us thought that was unlikely to happen - and then both OKC and Miami dramatically turned it around. In each case it felt odd.

When we think about it, the Heat-Celtics series' narrative felt strange, but isn't all that surprising when we step back a little. Boston is a great defensive team, the best in the league, and possess fantastic chemistry. They also are well-coached and have been one of the more resilient squads in recent memory. In short, they maximize their (somewhat limited) talent. The Heat meanwhile are poorly coached and have poor chemistry. They rarely seem to actualize their considerable talent, particularly offensively. So the fact this series went seven is not really all that shocking, it just felt weird because of the extreme ebbs and flows the series had throughout.

On the other hand, Spurs-Thunder was one of the craziest series I have ever witnessed. I have never seen a fantastic team (playing so, so well) win the first two games convincingly - and then proceed to get swept. I mean it was stunning. It is very easy now to say the Thunder simply were the better team, but if you watched the Spurs play those first two games it ceases to make a lot of sense. The Spurs to the naked eye seemed rather easily to be the best team in basketball. And then OKC beat them four straight times. This happens directly after the Spurs went undefeated for fifty days.

The Western Finals were truly crazy. Part of me wants to use the lockout as an explanation for such a dramatic turn in that series, but that seems farfetched. We also can use the explanation that San Antonio just got too tired as the series became prolonged, but I don't honestly buy that either. The truth is sometimes you just can't predict what will happen when two damn good teams meet in the playoffs. And so we end up with the Finals matchup most of us expected, and then did not expect at all. Heat-Thunder. I could give you a prediction, but it wouldn't mean much after what I just said. Enjoy.

The top of the 2012 draft is a risky proposition

6/9/2012

Given how little we can really know about what the future holds for even the brighest of prospects, the top of a NBA draft every year is a bit scary. If you have a top 5 selection you have a pretty good chance of being able to select a future all-star. But you also have a pretty good chance of drafting a player who ends up being simply adequate. The difference is jarring.

It's okay to strikeout with picks later in the first round, but when you have a very high pick and you use it on a guy who ends up being mediocre, it always hurts. Not all drafts are created equal. Some years there seem to be more "sure things" than other years. Sometimes there is a general consensus that at least three or four players in a draft should be very good. 2007, 2008, and 2010 were all recently like that. Last year and this year are not.

The top portion of the 2012 draft is pretty dubious. After we get past Anthony Davis with the first pick, everything becomes unclear. There are no other players that are unanimously considered future All-Stars. It seems quite possible that there will be as much future value with the players picked in the mid-teens as there will be with the players selected between picks #2 and #8.

If I were a team with a pick between #2 and #5 I would be scared. Nothing seems surefire after Davis, and you want a player that seems too good to pass up when you have that high a pick. Don't get me wrong - I expect a few players in this draft to make several All-Star games. The problem is besides Davis I have no idea who those players will be.

When you don't feel very good about the top of the draft and you possess a top 5 pick the best thing you can do is trade down, or trade your pick for an established star. It is the most pudent and risk-adverse action you can take. And being risk-adverse in regards to the lottery is usually the way to go.

There are probably some executives who have a very good feeling about who the second and third best players in the 2012 draft are. If they feel very certain in their opinion they should do what they can to get in position to draft those guys, whether it be through trade or simply selecting them with their pick. But honestly I think most teams don't really have any idea what to make of most of the players in this draft. I could easily see someone nobody expects - like Moe Harkless, Quincy Miller or John Henson - becoming the second best player in the draft. Of course I could also see any of those three players becoming busts, and that is what makes this draft so confounding.

When we aren't sure who will be very good it is best to hedge our bets, and the easiest way to do that is with multiple picks. Houston is probably better off with picks #14 and #16 than Washington is with pick #3. They have two chances to get it right; Washington presently only has one. Most drafts are not as extreme as this; the #3 pick is almost always (much) more valuable than two picks in the teens. This year is kind of like last year, where after the first pick we really are left pretty clueless.

It is worth adding that there are several lottery-projected picks that I think have a decent chance of becoming All-Stars. I like Bradley Beal a lot. I also like Jared Sullinger, Henson, Dion Waiters and Damian Lillard. And it's pretty easy for me to see why some scouts are so fond of Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, Andre Drummond, Thomas Robinson and Harrison Barnes.

But I wouldn't draft any of them with the second or third pick. It's too risky. Sometimes having the fortitude to say no to something you like but don't love is painful but necessary. NBA teams picking high in this draft would be wise to remember this.

Drafting the unknown

6/6/2012

Why is the ability to draft well probably the most important aspect of running a team?

Because it is a skill that deals directly with trying to successfully gauge the unknown.

It is much easier to know how good a player will be once he has played in the NBA. Of course the value of a player changes over the years, and hopefully he gets better as he matures, but even after only a few months of playing in the league most executives can somewhat accurately tell how good a player should be.

Before a college star plays a pro game this is a different story. It is simply hard to predict a specific future value for most of these college kids.

Even someone like Anthony Davis - who everybody likes and thinks will be good - has heard a wide range of comparisons regarding his pro potential. You can compare him to Marcus Camby and people will understand. You can also compare him to Tim Duncan and people will understand. The wide gulf of interpretation of a college player's potential leaves much to be discovered.

Obviously there is a gigantic difference between Camby and Duncan's pro careers, but right now we don't know which path Davis' career will more closely resemble. This uncertainty shows us how little we can know about college prospects.

By January of next year we will probably have a pretty decent idea what Davis' potential should look like, but right now we do not. It is hard to predict what exactly a player will turn into, even when we like him very much. It is always worth remembering that.

Often executives and scouts come up with general opinions of where a college player should be picked in the draft - a majority opinion - and "tier" the draft accordingly. There are players that are considered certain top five picks, other players who are likely lottery picks, others who are sure first rounders, etc.

This is how NBA teams make sense of the unknown. A general consensus among executives and scouts determines the expected order of the draft, and usually the actual draft order plays out the way this majority opinion expected it would. Nobody this year is going to draft Memphis' Will Barton before UNC's Harrison Barnes, even though there is no guarantee that Barnes will actually turn out to be a better pro. This is because it would be too contrarian towards the consensus opinion.

Theoretically the majority opinion of what the draft order should be helps fight against the unknown. What it indisputably does is help save face for the poor executive who drafts a bust. This reason alone leads to extremely similar mock draft orders being formed by most teams - if someone is wrong with a pick the reasoning can be that at least they were just part of the large majority that was also wrong.

The problem, every year, is that the consensus draft order is often incorrect. Many lottery picks turn out to be busts, while players picked late in the first round and second round often turn into very good NBA players. Some second rounders end up vastly superior to almost all of the guys picked before them.

So the NBA draft, no matter what they tell you, is damn hard to figure. That is why it is almost laughable when scouts get excited over a "good" draft as opposed to a "bad" draft (this year's draft started as the former and now apparently has become the latter.) The truth is we just don't know. It is hard enough to predict the future quality of even a few players in the draft, let alone the entire thing.

What a good NBA general manager should try to do is hedge his bets. Because the degree of uncertainty in a NBA draft is so high, it is best to always understand the element of risk involved when it comes to his draft choices. This is especially true with high draft picks. Top five picks can make or break a franchise. If you choose the right player you might have an All-Star for the next fifteen years, and if you screw up you end up with essentially nothing.

Therefore a good part of the NBA draft is simply risk aversion, especially with high picks. If you truly think a player will be exceptional it is important to take him, but it is maybe just as important not to take the wrong player. In many ways it doesn't matter if you're right - you just don't want to be wrong.

If this sounds confusing that is because it is.

If your team has a high pick you want to feel very confident that you are picking a guy who will be a productive pro. But the reality is always there: you can't truly have a good sense of what the player you select will end up becoming. At best you will have very auspicious signs of future success, but you will not know much beyond that (like in the case of Davis.) Sure things become busts, and lightly regarded second round picks become All-Stars. These things happen regularly.

Somebody who drafts well knows he doesn't know much. He is risk adverse, yet looks for value in every part of the draft. He understands there is nothing worse than squandering a high draft pick on someone who has incredible potential but fails to ever realize it, but he also understands that it is impossible to know for sure how good a player will be before he even plays a professional game. When analyzing the draft we should be using all the helpful statistical and scouting information we can find - and we should also realize that despite all these tools often working, sometimes they fail us miserably.

If you can draft well you are a good executive. The best way to draft well is to acknowledge the amount of sheer luck involved, and to also know there is still a way to work with that luck in an intelligent and advantageous way.